

Code Generation for Data Processing

Lecture 11: JIT Compilation and Sandboxing

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JIT Compilation

- ▶ Ahead-of-Time compilation not always possible/sufficient
- ▶ “Dynamic source” code: pre-compilation not possible
 - ▶ JavaScript, `eval()`, database queries
 - ▶ Binary translation of highly-dynamic/JIT-compiled code
- ▶ Additional verification/analysis or increased portability desired
 - ▶ (e)BPF, WebAssembly
- ▶ Dynamic optimization on common types/values
 - ▶ Run-time sampling of frequent code paths, allows dynamic speculation
 - ▶ Relevant for highly dynamic languages – otherwise prefer PGO⁵⁰

⁵⁰Profile-Guided Optimization; GCC: `-fprofile-generate` to store information about branches/values; `-fprofile-use` to use it

JIT Compilation: Simple Approach

- ▶ Use standard compiler, write shared library
- ▶ Can write compiler IR, or plain source code
- ▶ `dlopen` + `dlsym` to find compiled function

- ▶ Example: `libgccjit`

- + Simple, fairly easy to debug
- Very high overhead, needs IO

JIT: Allocating Memory

- ▶ `malloc()` – memory often non-executable
- ▶ `alloca()` – memory often non-executable
- ▶ `mmap(PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_EXEC)` – $W \oplus X$ may prevent this
 - ▶ $W \oplus X$: a page must never be writable and executable at the same time
 - ▶ Some OS's (e.g. OpenBSD) and CPUs (Apple Silicon) strictly enforce this
- ▶ For code generation: map pages read–write
 - ▶ NetBSD needs special argument to allow remapping the page as executable
- ▶ Before execution: change protection to (read–)execute

JIT: Making Code Executable

- ▶ Adjust page-level protections: `mprotect`
 - ▶ OS will adjust page tables
 - ▶ Typically incurs TLB shutdown
- ▶ Other steps might be needed, highly OS-dependent
 - ▶ Read manual

JIT: Making Code Executable

- ▶ Flush instruction cache
 - ▶ Flush DCache to unification point (last-level cache)
 - ▶ Invalidate ICache in *all* cores for virtual address range
 - ▶ After local flush, kernel might move thread to other core with old ICache
- ▶ x86: coherent ICache/DCache hierarchy – hardware detects changes
 - ▶ Also includes: transparent (but expensive) detection of self-modifying code
- ▶ AArch64, MIPS, SPARC, ... (Linux): user-space instructions
- ▶ ARMv7, RISC-V⁵¹ (Linux), all non-x86 (Darwin): system call
- ▶ Skipping ICache flush: spurious, hard-to-debug problems

⁵¹RISC-V has user `fence.i`, but only affects current core

Code Generation: Differences AoT vs. JIT

	Ahead-of-Time	JIT Compilation
Code Model	Arbitrary	Large (or PIC with custom PLT)
Relocations	Linker/Loader	JIT compiler/linker
Symbols	Linker/Loader	JIT compiler/linker may need application symbols
Memory Mapping	OS/Loader	JIT compiler/linker
EHFrame	Compiler/Linker/Loader	JIT compiler/linker register in unwind runtime
Debuginfo	Compiler/Linker/Debugger	JIT compiler register with debugger

- ▶ JIT compiler and linker are often merged

JIT: Code Model

- ▶ Code can be located anywhere in address space
 - ▶ Cannot rely on linker to put in, e.g., lowest 2 GiB
- ▶ Large code model: allows for arbitrarily-sized addresses
- ▶ Small-PIC: possible for relocations inside object
 - ▶ Needs new PLT/GOT for other symbols
- ▶ Overhead trade-off: wide immediates vs. extra indirection (PLT)
- ▶ Further restrictions may apply (ISA/OS)

JIT: Relocations and Symbols

- ▶ JIT compiler must take care of relocations
 - ▶ Can try to directly process relocations during machine code gen.
 - ▶ Not always possible: cyclic dependencies
 - ▶ Option: behave like normal compiler with separate runtime linker
- ▶ Code may need to access functions/global variables from application
 - ▶ Option: JIT compiler “hard-codes” relevant symbols
 - ▶ Option: application registers relevant symbols
 - ▶ Option: application linked with `--export-dynamic` and use `dlsym`

JIT: Memory Layout

- ▶ *Never* place code and (writable) data on same page
 - ▶ $W \oplus X$; and writes near code can trigger self-modifying code detection
 - ▶ Avoid many small allocations with one page each
 - ▶ But: editing existing code pages is problematic
- ▶ Choose suitable alignment for code
 - ▶ Page alignment is too large: poor cache utilization
 - ▶ ICache cache line size not too relevant, decode buffer size is typical value: 16 bytes
 - ▶ Some basic blocks (e.g., hot loop entries) can benefit from 16-byte alignment

JIT: `.eh_frame` Registration (required for C++)

- ▶ Unwinder finds `.eh_frame` using program headers
- ▶ Problem: JIT-compiled code has no program headers
- ▶ Idea: JIT compiler registers new code with runtime

- ▶ libc provides `__register_frame` and `__deregister_frame`
 - ▶ Call with address of first Frame Description Entry (FDE)
 - ▶ Historically also called by init code

JIT: GDB Debuginfo Registration (optional)

- ▶ GDB finds debug info from section headers of DSOs
- ▶ Problem: JIT-compiled code has no DSO
- ▶ Idea: JIT compiler registers new code with debugger
- ▶ Define function `__jit_debug_register_code` and global var. `__jit_debug_descriptor`
 - ▶ Call function on update; GDB places breakpoint in function
 - ▶ Prevent function from being inlined
- ▶ Descriptor is linked list of in-memory object files
 - ▶ Needs relocations applied, also for debug info
- ▶ Users: LLVM, Wasmtime, HHVM, ...; consumers: GDB, LLDB

JIT: Linux perf Registration (optional)

- ▶ perf tracks binary through backing file of mmap
- ▶ Problem 1: JIT-compiled code has no backing file for its mmap region
- ▶ Problem 2: after tracing, JIT-compiled code is gone
- ▶ Goal 1: map instructions to functions
- ▶ Goal 2: keep JIT-compiled code for detailed analysis

- ▶ Approach 1: dump function limits to `/tmp/perf-<PID>.map`⁵²
 - ▶ Text file; format: `startaddr size name\n`
- ▶ Approach 2: *needs an extra slide*

⁵²<https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/tools/perf/Documentation/jit-interface.txt>

JIT: Linux perf JITDUMP format (optional)

- ▶ JIT-compiler dumps function name/address/size/code⁵³
 - ▶ JITDUMP file: record list for each function, may contain debuginfo
 - ▶ File name must be `jit-<PID>.dump`
- ▶ JIT-compiler `mmaps` part of the file as executable somewhere
 - ▶ Only use: `perf` keeps track of executable mappings \rightsquigarrow mapping is JIT marker, s.t. `perf` can find the file later
- ▶ Need to run `perf report` with `-k 1` to use monotonic clock
- ▶ After profiling: `perf inject --jit -i perf.data -o jit.data`
 - ▶ Extracts functions from JITDUMP, each into its own ELF file
 - ▶ Changes mappings of profile to refer to newly created files
- ▶ `perf report -i jit.data` – Profit!

⁵³<https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/tools/perf/Documentation/jitdump-specification.txt>

Compilation Time

- ▶ Problem: code generation takes time
 - ▶ Especially high-complexity frameworks like GCC or LLVM
- ▶ Compilation time of JIT compilers often matters
 - ▶ Example: website needing JavaScript on page load
 - ▶ Example: compiling database query
- ▶ Functions executed once are not worth optimizing
- ▶ But: often not known in advance

- ▶ Idea: adaptive compilation
- ▶ Incrementally spend more time on optimization

Compilation Time: Simple Approach

Caching

- ▶ Doesn't work on first execution

Adaptive Execution

- ▶ Execution tiers have different compile-time/run-time tradeoffs
 - ▶ Bytecode interpreter: very fast/slow
 - ▶ Fast compiler: medium/medium
 - ▶ Optimizing compiler: slow/fast
- ▶ Start with interpreter, profile execution
 - ▶ E.g., collect stats on execution frequency, dynamic types, ...
- ▶ For program worth optimizing, switch to next tier
 - ▶ Depends on profile information, e.g. only optimize hot code
 - ▶ Compile in background, switch when ready

Adaptive Execution: Switching Tiers

- ▶ Switching only possible at compiler-defined points
 - ▶ Needs to serialize relevant state for other tier
- ▶ Simple approach: only switch at function boundaries
 - ▶ Simple, well-defined boundaries; unable to switch inside loop
- ▶ Complex approach: allow switching at loop headers/everywhere
 - ▶ Needs tracking of much more meta-information
 - ▶ All entry points need well-defined interface
 - ▶ All exit points need info to recover complete state
 - ▶ Severely limits optimizations; all loops become irreducible

- ▶ Using LLVM is possible, but not a good fit

Adaptive Execution: Partial Compilation and Speculation

- ▶ Observation: even in hot functions, many branches are rarely used
- ▶ Optimizing cold code is wasted time(/energy)
- ▶ Observation (JS): functions often get called with same data type
- ▶ Specializing on structure allows removing string lookup for fields
- ▶ Idea: speculate on common path using profiling data
- ▶ Add check whether speculation holds; if not, use side-exit
 - ▶ Side-exit can be patched later with actual code
- ▶ Side-exit must serialize all relevant state for lower tier
 - ▶ “Deoptimization”

Sandboxing

- ▶ Executing untrusted code without additional measures may harm system
- ▶ Untrusted input may expose vulnerabilities
- ▶ Goal 1: execute untrusted code without impacting security
 - ▶ Code in higher-level representation allows for further analyses but needs JIT compilation for performance
- ▶ Goal 2: limit impact potential of new vulnerabilities
- ▶ Other goals: portability, resource usage, performance, usability, language flexibility

Approach: Sandbox Operating System as-is

- ▶ Idea: put entire operating system in sandbox (“virtual machine”)
- ▶ Widely used in practice
- ▶ Virtualization needs hardware and OS support
 - ▶ CPU has hypervisor mode which controls guest OS; offers nested paging, hypercalls from guest OS to hypervisor
- + Good usability and performance
- + Strong isolation
- Rather high overhead on resource usage: completely new OS
- Inflexible and high start latency (seconds)

Approach: Sandbox Native Code as-is

- ▶ Idea: strongly restrict possibilities of native code
- ▶ Restrict system calls: seccomp
 - ▶ Filter program for system calls depending on arguments
- ▶ Separate namespaces: network, PID, user, mount, ...
 - ▶ Isolate program from rest of the system
 - ▶ Need to allow access to permitted resources
- ▶ Limit resource usage: memory, CPU, ... cgroups

Approach: Sandbox Native Code as-is

- ▶ Frequently and widely used (“container”)
- + Good usability and performance, low latency (milliseconds)
- + Finer grained control of resources
- ~ Resource usage: often completely new user space
- Weak isolation: OS+CPU often bad at separation
 - ▶ Kernel has a fairly large interface, not hardened against bad actors
 - ▶ Privilege escalation happens not rarely

Approach: Sandbox Native Code with Modification

- ▶ Idea: enforce limitations on machine code
 - ▶ Define restrictions on machine code, e.g. no unbounded memory access
 - ▶ Modify compiler to comply with restrictions
 - ▶ Verify program at load time
- ▶ Google Native Client⁵⁴, originally x86-32, ported to x86-64 and ARM
- ▶ Designed as browser extension
- ▶ Native code shipped to browser, executed after validation

⁵⁴B Yee et al. "Native client: A sandbox for portable, untrusted x86 native code". In: *SP*. 2009, pp. 79–93.

NaCl Constraints on i386

- ▶ Problem: dynamic code not verifiable
 - ⇒ No self-modifying/dynamically generated code
- ▶ Problem: overlapping instructions
 - ⇒ All “valid” instructions must be reachable in linear disassembly
 - ⇒ Direct jumps must target valid instructions
 - ⇒ No instruction may cross 32-byte boundary
 - ⇒ Indirect jumps/returns must be `and eax, -32; jmp eax`
- ▶ Problem: arbitrary memory access inside virtual memory
 - ⇒ Separate process, use segmentation restrict accessible memory
- ▶ Problem: program can run arbitrary CPU instructions
 - ⇒ Blacklist “dangerous” instructions

NaCl on non-i386 Systems

- ▶ Other architectures⁵⁵ use base register instead of segment offsets
 - ▶ Additional verification required
 - ▶ Deprecated in 2017 in favor of WebAssembly
- + Nice idea, high performance (5–15% overhead)
- ~ Instruction blacklist not a good idea
- Not portable, severe restrictions on emitted code
 - High verification complexity, error-prone

⁵⁵D Sehr et al. "Adapting Software Fault Isolation to Contemporary {CPU} Architectures". In: *19th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 10)*. 2010.

Approach: Using Bytecode

- ▶ Idea: compile code to bytecode, JIT-compile on host
 - ▶ Benefit: verification easy – all code generated by trusted compiler
 - ▶ Benefit: more portable
- ▶ Java applets
- ▶ PNaCl: bytecode version of NaCl
- + Fairly high performance, portable
- ~ Heavy runtime environment
 - ▶ Especially criticized for Java applets
- Very high complexity and attack surface

Approach: Subset of JavaScript: asm.js

- ▶ Situation: fairly fast JavaScript JIT-compilers present
- ▶ Idea: use subset of JavaScript known to be compilable to efficient code
 - ▶ All browsers/JS engines support execution without further changes
- ▶ asm.js⁵⁶: strictly, statically typed JS subset; single array as heap
- ▶ JS code generated by compilers, e.g. Emscripten
- ▶ JavaScript has single numeric type, but asm.js supports int/float/double
 - ▶ Coercion to integer: `x|0`
 - ▶ Coercion to double: `+x`
 - ▶ Coercion to float: `Math.fround(x)`

asm.js Example

```
var log = stdlib.Math.log;
var values = new stdlib.Float64Array(buffer);
function logSum(start, end) {
  start = start|0; // parameter type int
  end = end|0; // parameter type int

  var sum = 0.0, p = 0, q = 0;

  // asm.js forces byte addressing of the heap by requiring shifting by 3
  for (p = start << 3, q = end << 3; (p|0) < (q|0); p = (p + 8)|0) {
    sum = sum + +log(values[p>>3]);
  }

  return +sum;
}
```

Example taken from the specification

Approach: Encode asm.js as Bytecode

- ▶ Parsing costs time, type restrictions increase code size
- ▶ Idea: encode asm.js source as bytecode
- ▶ First attempt: encode abstract syntax tree in pre-order
- ▶ Second attempt: encode abstract syntax tree in post-order
- ▶ Third attempt: encode as stack machine
- ▶ ... and WebAssembly was born

Approach: Using Bytecode – WebAssembly

- ▶ Strictly-typed bytecode format encoding a stack machine
- ▶ Global variables and single, global array as memory
- ▶ Functions have local variables
 - ▶ Parameters pre-populated in first local variables
 - ▶ No dynamic/addressable stack space! \rightsquigarrow part of global memory used as stack
- ▶ Operations use implicit stack
 - ▶ Stack has well-defined size and types at each point in program
- ▶ Structured control flow
 - ▶ Blocks to skip instructions, loop to repeat, if-then-else
 - ▶ No irreducible control flow representable

Approach: Use Verifiable Bytecode – eBPF

- ▶ Problem: want to ensure termination within certain time frame
- ▶ Problem: need to make sure *nothing* can go wrong – no sandbox!
- ▶ Idea: disallow loops and undefined register values, e.g. due to branch
 - ▶ Combinatorial explosion of possible paths, all need to be analyzed
 - ▶ No longer Turing-complete
- ▶ eBPF: allow user-space to hook into various Linux kernel parts
 - ▶ E.g. network, perf sampling, ...
- ▶ Strongly verified register machine
- ▶ JIT-compiled inside kernel

JIT Compilation and Sandboxing – Summary

- ▶ JIT compilation required for dynamic source code or bytecode
- ▶ Bytecode allows for simpler verification than machine code, but is more compact
- ▶ Producing JIT-compiled code needs CPU, OS, and runtime support
- ▶ JIT compilers can do/need to do different kinds of optimizations
adaptive execution is key technique to hide compilation latency
- ▶ Sandboxing can be done at various levels and granularities
- ▶ Virtualization and containers widely used for whole applications
- ▶ Bytecode formats popular for ad-hoc distribution of programs

JIT Compilation and Sandboxing – Questions

- ▶ When is JIT-compilation beneficial over Ahead-of-Time compilation?
- ▶ How can JIT-compilation be realized using standard compilers?
- ▶ How can code be made executable after writing it to memory?
- ▶ Why do some architectures require a system call for ICache flushing?
- ▶ How can JIT compilers trade between compilation latency and performance?
- ▶ Why is sandboxing important?
- ▶ What methods of deploying code for sandboxed execution are widely used?